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[L. A. No. 29596. In Bank. Jan. 20, 1969.] 
RICHARD BLONIARZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C. B. 
ROLOSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Inherent Power of Conrt.-A 
court of general jurisdiction has inherent equity power, aside 
from statutory authorization, to vacate and set aside default 
judgments obtained through extrinsic fraud or mistake 
[2] Id.-Equitable Relief-Proceedings to Obtain.-The inherent 
equity power of a court of general jurisdiction to vacate and 
set aside default judgments obtained through extrinsic fraud 
or mistake may be invoked by motion or by an independent 
action in equity. 
[3] Municipal Courts-J'urisdiction.:-A municipal court is not a 
court of general jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is limited by the 
II] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 157 et seq; Am.Jur., Judg-
ments (rev ed § 750 et seq). 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 179. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Judgments, § 227; [2] Judgments, 
§ 259; [3, 10] Municipal Courts, § 11(1); [4] Municipal Courts, 
§11(6); I6] Courts, §5; [7] Courts, §79; [8] Courts, §80; [9] 
Judgments, §§ 185, 227; [11] Municipal Courts, § 13.5; [12] 
Actions, Proceedings and Remedies, § 13. 
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Constitution to that prescribed by the Legislature. (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 5.) 
Id.-Jurisdiction-Suits in Equity-Exception to Rule.-A 
motion to vacate a default judgment on grounds of extrinsic 
fraud or mistake is not a defensive pleading, nor can a munici- - ---- ---
pal court's jurisdiction to entertain such a motion be otherwise 
implied from Code Civ. Proc., § 89, prescribing the original and 
equitablejurisdiction of municipal courts. 
Judgments-Equitable Relief-Power of Court to Grant.-
The power to set aside judgments obtained through extrinsic 
fraud and mistake is within the equity jurisdiction of a court 
and, unless limited by statute, is a necessary incident of the 
constitutional grant of general jurisdiction. 
Courts - Inherent Powers. - As distinguished from equity 
jurisdiction, every court of record has powers requisite to its 
proper functioning as an independent constitutional depart-
ment of government, including the power to punish for con-
tempt, to preserve order in the court, and to feed and house 
jurors. 
[7] Id.-Records-Amendment and Correction.-The power to 
amend and control process and orders reflected in Code Civ. 
Proc., § 128, subd. 8, is limited to such exercise as the correc-
tion of clerical errors, the setting aside of judgments and 
orders inadvertently made and not the result of an exercise of 
judgment, the prevention of the wrongful use of proce~s right-
fully issued, and amendment of summons to conform to exis~ 
ing facts; such powers are inherently necessary for the court! 
to make its judgments speak the truth and to insure that it~ 
orders are carried out in the manner that conforms to justice 
and the court's intention. 
[8] Id.- Records - Amendment and Correction - Limitation on 
Power.-The power to amend and control process and orders 
reflected in Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. 8, does not include the 
consideration of extrinsic factors that invoke the jurisdiction 
of equity, such as extrinsic fraud or mistake or inadvertence 
that may have deprived one party of a fair adversary hearing. 
[9] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Time for Application for 
Relief: Equitable Relief.-Once the six months have run under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 473, relating to the vacating of default judg-
ments on motion, only a court of equity has power to set aside 
a judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud or mistake or 
inadvertence, and this equitable power is distinct from the 
power to amend and correct records. 
[10] Municipal Courts - Jurisdiction - Equitable Relief From 
Judgments Obtained by Extrinsic Fraud.-A municipal court 
is without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set aside a, 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 45; Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 78 et seq. 
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judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud, mistake, inadvert-
ence, or surprise, after the six-month period under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 473, relating to vacating of judgments on motion, has 
run, 
[11a, llb] Id.-Transfers to Superior Oourt.-The municipal 
court should have transferred a cause to the superior court 
.under Code Civ. Proc., § 396, relating to transfer of cases filed 
in courts not having jurisdiction, and dismissal was contrary 
to the law's policy that cases should be tried on their merits 
rather than dismissed for technieal defects in pleading, where, 
by motion to set aside a municipal court judgment allegedly 
obtained through "extrinsic fraud and/or mistake" made after 
the six-month period under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, had run, 
which the municipal court had no jurisdiction to entertain, 
defendant sought relief afforded by California courts; relief 
was available to him only through an independent action in 
equity, as his motion would have been required to be viewed 
by the superior court, and the superior court was the only 
court that could grant the relief sought. 
[12] Actions - Olassification - Determination of Nature. - The 
nature of an action and the issues involved are to be deter-
mined, not from the appellation given the pleading, but from 
the facts alleged and the relief that they support. 
APPEAL from an order of the Municipal Court of the 
Santa Monica Judicial District of Los Angeles County deny-
ing a motion to vacate a default judgment. F. B. Mullendore, 
JUdge. Reversed with directions. 
Marvin E. Levin and Marvin S. Freedman for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Wells & Herring and William G. Wells for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.--Dn December 6, 1966, the Municipal 
Court of the Santa Monica Judicial District entered a default 
judgment for $1,715 in favor of plaintiff. On September 14, 
1967, defendant filed a notice of motion to vacate the judg-
ment and the entry of default upon which it was based on the 
ground that they "were procured by extrinsic fraud and/or 
pxtrinsic mistake." This motion was denied on September 26, 
1967. Defendant appeals. 
Although plaintiff resisted the motion on the merits, he also 
urged that a municipal court does not have jurisdiction to 
entertain a motion to vacate a judgment obtained by extrinsic 
) 
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fraud or mistake. 'fhc minute order disposing of the motion 
merely states "Denied" without indicating whether the rul-
ing was based on the merits or on lack of jurisdiction. 
The appellate department of the superior court affirmed the 
order on the ground that the municipal court lacked jurisdic-
tion. That department also held that the municipal court had 
no authority to transfer the cause to the superior court under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 396. Under the authority of 
rules 62 and 63 of the California Rules of Court, however, the 
appellate department certified the cause to the Court of 
Appeal for the Second District to consider both the jurisdic-
tional question and the question of transferability of the 
cause under section 396. 
The Court of Appeal held that the municipal court had 
jurisdiction and reversed the order and remanded the cause to 
the municipal court for a hearing and determination on the 
merits. Because of a direct conflict between this holding and 
that of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District in Strachan 
v. American Ins. Co. (1968) 260 CaI.App.2d 113 [66 Cal. 
Rptr. 742], we granted a hearing. 
Six months having passed since the entry of the default, the 
defendant's motion was not directed to the municipal court's 
statutory power to grant relief under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 473. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Ca1.2d 849, 855 
[48 Cal.Rptr. 620, 409 P.2d 700] ; Phillips v. Trusheim (1945) 
25 Ca1.2d 913, 917 [156 P.2d 25] ; Thompson v. Vallembois 
(1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 21, 24 [30 Cal.Rptr. 796].) Defendant 
therefore contends that the municipal court has an inherent 
power to set aside a judgment or order obtained through' 
extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake. We have concluded that 
the municipal court has no jurisdiction by statute or by virtue 
of inherent power to consider this motion. 
[1] A court of general jurisdiction has inherent equity 
power, aside from statutory authorization, to vacate and set 
aside default judgments obtained through extrinsic fraud or 
mistake. (Weitz v. Yankosky, supra, 63 CaI.2d 849, 855; Hal-
lett v. Slaughter (1943) 22 Ca1.2d 552, 557 [140 P.2d 3] ; 
Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Ca1.2d 570, 576 [122 P.2d 564, 140 
A.L.R 1328]; see Cal. Civil Appellate Practice (Cont. Ed. 
Bar) §§ 4.30-4.35; 30A Am.Jur., Judgments, §§ 755, 769, 783-
784.) [2] This power may be invoked by motion or by an 
independent action in equity. (Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19· 
Ca1.2d 570, 576; Shields v. Siegel (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 334, 
337 [54 Cal.Rptr. 577].) 
\ 
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[3] A municipal court, however, is not a court of general 
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution to 
that prescribed by the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5; 
St. James Church v. Superior Court (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 
352, 362 [287 P.2d 387] ; In re Shaw (1953) 115 Ca.l.App.2d 
753,755 [252 P.2d 970].) The Legislature has given munici-
pal courts original jurisdiction in "all cases in equity when 
pleaded as a defensive matter, in any case properly pending 
in such municipal court." (Code Civ. Proc. § 89, subd. 2.) 
[4] As the Court of Appeal in Strachan v. American Ins. 
Co., supra, 260 Cal.App.2d 113, properly concluded, a motion 
to vacate a default judgment on grounds of extrinsic fraud or 
mistake is· not a defensive pleading (see e.g., Jacobson v. 
Superior Court (1936) 5 Cal.2d 170 [53 P.2d 756] ; Garden-
swartz v. Equitable Life As sur. Soc. (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 
Supp. 745 [68 P.2d 322] ; Altman v. McCollum (1951) 107 
Cal.App2d Supp. 847, 857 [236 P.2d 914]), nor can jurisdic-
tion to entertain such a motion be otherwise implied from 
section 89. 
Defendant contends that the power of the municipal court 
to hear and decide the motion in question derives from an 
inherent power of every court in any action in which it other-
wise has jurisdiction" [t]o amend and control its process and 
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. 8) ; in other words a grant of 
jurisdiction, no matter how limited, carries with it an implied 
or inherent power to set aside judgments of the court obtained 
through extrinsic fraud or mistake. This interpretation of the 
law misapprehends the nature of equity jurisdiction and the 
scope of section 128. 
A distinction has long been made between the equity powers 
that inhere in courts of general jurisdiction and powers, 
primarily of an administrative nature, that inhere in all 
courts of record. [5] The power to set aside judgments 
obtained through extrinsic fraud and mistake is within the 
equity jurisdiction of a court. (5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
dence(Equitable Remedies (2d ed.» pp. 4671, 4672.) Unless 
limited by statute, this power is a necessary incident of the 
constitutional grant of general jurisdiction. (See Tulare Irr. 
Dist. v. Superior Court (1925) 197 Cal. 649,660 [242 P. 725] : 
City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 781, 788 
[109 P. 620, 21 Ann.Cas. 1355].) [6] As distinguished 
from equity jurisdiction, every court of record has powers 
requisite to its proper functioning as an independent consti-
) 
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tutional department of government (Brydonjack v. State Bar 
(1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507] ; 20 
Am.Jur., Courts, §§ 78, 79) including the power to punish for 
contempt (Lyons v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 755, 758 
[278 P.2d 681]), to preserve order in the court (Oantillon v. 
Superior Court (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 184, 187 [309 P.2d 
890]), and to feed and house jurors (Hart Bros. 00. v. 
Oounty of Los Angeles (1938) 31 Cal.App.2d Supp. 766 [82 
P.2d 221]). 
[7] The power to amend and control process and orders 
reflected in section 128, subdivision 8, is limited to such exer-
cise ~ the correction of clerical errors (see Drinkhouse v. 
VanNess (1927) 202 Cal. 359, 370 [260 P. 869] ; Chadwick v. 
Superior Oourt (1928) 205 Cal. 163, 165 [270 P. 192] ; Roth v. 
Marston (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 249, 251 [242 P.2d 375] ; 30A 
Am.Jur., Judgments, § 604 et seq.) ; the setting aside of judg-
ments and orders inadvertently made and not the result of an 
exercise of judgment (see In re McGee (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 6, 9 ____ _ 
[229 P.2d 780] ; Bastajian v. Brown (1941) 19 Ca1.2d 209, 214 
[120 P.2d 9]) ; the prevention of the wrongful use of process 
rightfully issued (see Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Ca1.2d 
210, 230-233 [317 P.2d 613] ; A.rc Inv. Co. v. Tiffith (1958) 
164 Cal.App.2d Supp.- 853, 857 [330 P.2d 305]) ; and amend-
ment of summons to conform to existing facts (see Morrissey 
v. Gray (1912) 162 Cal. 638, 646 [124 P. 246] ; Baldwin v. 
Foster (1910) 157 Cal. 643, 647 [108 P. 714]). Such powers 
are inherently necessary for the court to make its judgments 
speak the truth and to insure that its orders are carried out in 
the manner that conforms to justice and the court's intention. 
[8] They do not, however, include the consideration of 
extrinsic factors that invoke the jurisdiction of equity, such 
as extrinsic fraud or mistake or inadvertence that may have 
deprived one party of a fair adversary hearing. [9] Once 
the six months have run under section 473, only a. court of 
equity has power to set aside a judgment on these grounds, 
and, as we made clear in Olivera, this equitable power is 
distinct from the power to amend and correct records. (Oli-
vera v. Grace, supra, 19 Ca1.2d 570, 575.) [10] "A munici-
pal court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion to set aside a judgment obtained through extrinsic 
fraud, mistake, inadvertence, or surprise after the six-month 
period under section 473 has run. 
[lla] The question remains whether the municipal court 
should have transferred the cause to the superior court under 
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Code of Civil Procedure section 396.1 The appellate depart-
ment held that section 396 did not authorize a transfer of a 
motion to vacate a judgment for extrinsic fraud or mistake on 
the ground that an "incidental matter" of this nature was 
neither an action nor a proceeding within the meaning of this 
section. 
[12] The nature of an action and the issues involved are 
to be determined, not from the appellation given the pleading, 
but from the facts alleged and the relief that they support. 
(Buxbom v. Smith (1944) 23 Ca1.2d 535,542 [145 P.2d 305] ; 
Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 634, 638 
[234 P.2d 981] ; Luckey v. Superior Court (1930) 209 Cal. 
360,366 [287 P. 450] ; McDougald v. Hulet (1901) 132 Cal. 154, 
160 [64 P. 278] ; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 452, 580.) [llb] Had 
the motion in question been filed in the superior court 
the only court with jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, 
conformity to this policy would have required that the plead-
ings be viewed as a separate "action" in equity. Dismissal 
under these circumstances would be contrary to our policy 
that cases should be tried on their merits rather than dis-
missed for technical defects in pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 452; Mix v. Yoakum (1927) 200 Cal. 681, 687 [254 P. 557] ; 
TayZor v. 8 &- M Lamp Co. (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 700, 703 
[12 Cal.Rptr. 323].) Defendant sought relief afforded by the 
courts of this state; relief is available in his case only through 
an independent action in equity. Since the superior court is 
the only court that could grant the relief sought, the cause 
Bhould have been transferred to that court under section 396. 
We venture no opinion as to the sufficiency of the pleadings 
to support the cause of action. That matter is for the superior 
court to decide subsequent to transfer. 
'The judgment is reversed, and the municipal court is 
directed to transfer the cause to the superior court. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
lSeetion 396 provides: "If an action or proeeeding is eommeneed in a 
court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof ... if there 
is a court of this State which has such jurisdiction, th~ action or pro-
ceeding shall not be dismissed . . • but shall . • • be transferred to a 
court having jurisdietion of the subjeet matter .••• ' I 
